

Geographical mobility and reproductive choices of Italian men

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Abstract

In addition to women's increased educational attainment and different institutional settings, also changed orientations toward family to achieve full life-satisfaction have been underlined to explain low fertility rates. Since Southern and Northern Italy differ for the institutional and economic setting, cultural orientations regarding the importance of family as well as fertility rates, also for Italy it seems reasonable to suppose that the latter are caused by both "structural" and "cultural" factors. We argue that South-to-North migrations could be an interpretative key of geographical differences in the timing and number of childbirths. In fact, migrants are socialized to different familiar behaviours, although they share with Northerners the same institutional and economic setting. We use data from the Italian Households Longitudinal Survey and apply event history models to Italian men's transition to parenthood. Our results show that North-South differences in the transition to the first child are largely explained by different level of female labour market participation, while preferences could have a crucial impact in the transition to the second child, where migrants and Southerners are equally much faster than Northerners. We think that these results contribute to both the literature about the determinants of fertility and the long-term consequences of migrations.

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Introduction

In socio-demographical literature it is well-known how increased female educational attainment and labour market participation play a crucial role to explain the historical trend of decrease in total fertility rates observed in most of OECD countries. In recent years, also the effects of labour market flexibilization reforms have been underlined as consistent, and it has been shown how different institutional settings filter the effects on fertility of both higher economic uncertainty and increased female labour market participation. This theoretical framework has been widely and successfully used to understand the historical pattern of family behaviours and cross-national differences.

Besides these kinds of explanations, other authors have stressed the role of changed preferences toward children to achieve full life-satisfaction. This is the core argument of the so-called “second demographic transition” thesis. Although this hypothesis has been discussed in many papers, it is much more difficult to assess its real explanatory power.

With our work we want to give a contribution to this discussion using Italian internal migrations, comparing fertility decisions of people living in the North, in the South, and different types of South-to-North migrants in a longitudinal setting. Since the two geographical areas are strongly different both for the institutional and economic conditions as well as declared preferences toward family, we claim that comparing those groups could represent an interesting empirical strategy to understand to what extent cultural orientations and institutional settings play a role in shaping fertility decisions. In fact, Southern internal migrants are socialized to the Southerner model of familiar behaviour, although they share with Northerners the same economic and institutional setting. Thus, adapting a model of transition to childhood for Italian men based on the sociological and demographical literature, we want to simulate a sort of “experiment” to verify if South-to-North migrants’ family behaviours reflect the fertility preferences dominant in their childhood environment.

In doing this, we use the main existing theories linking individuals’ migrations and their life-cycles, mainly developed for international migrations. Unfortunately, a lack of longitudinal data on international migrants makes the control of those theories problematic in several aspects (Singley and Nancy, 1998). First, the lacks of

information on the fertility of non-migrant in the area of origin limit our knowledge about the changes in fertility behaviours that are typically associated with migration. Second, a lack of information about the precise timing of migration and fertility further restrict any casual inference that can be made about the migration-fertility relationship. Finally, cross-sectional data lack information on the precise timing of other factors – such as women’s employment or union formation – that might be related to both migration and fertility processes. On the contrary, the case of Italian internal migrations gives us a better chance to test not only the role of preferences, but also alternative theories on the relations between migrants and their life-cycle.

The paper is organized as follows: in the first paragraph we review the main literature linking micro-level explanations of the fertility decrease with different institutional settings, focusing on the case of Italy. In the second paragraph the issues of preferences and North/South differences are introduced and then we briefly report on the main theories linking migrations and fertility choices. In the fourth paragraph we join all the theoretical arguments in a model for Italian men’s transition to childbirths and our research hypotheses are presented. Finally, the results of our longitudinal analysis are discussed.

1. Micro-mechanisms of reproductive behaviour in Italy in the frame of the welfare regimes theory and the role of preferences

During the last decades, concomitantly with the rising number of women in the workforce, we witnessed a dramatic change in family-formation behaviour: many couples delay or limit childbearing or decide not to have children at all (Steiber, 2007). This complex process, entailing the delay of the transition to adulthood as a whole, has been also referred to as the “postponement syndrome” (see, for instance, Livi Bacci, 2001; Gustaffson and Wetzels, 2000).

In order to explain these phenomena the main literature focuses on both explicative mechanisms at the micro-level and on the effects of the macro-level of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999). Starting from the former, according to the economic theory of family (Becker, 1991), the main reason to explain the historical process of

decrease in fertility rates after the end of the 1960s is the increased participation in the educational system, in particular among women. On this point Billari et al. (2006: 5) wrote that “given the consistency of the various findings in the literature, trends in female education can be seen as a major force shaping the postponement of childbearing in Europe”. With the increased opportunity costs of childrearing, it is not surprising that fertility rates have fallen down in all the OECD countries, mainly because what has not changed is that women, employed or not, still tend to perform more household and childcare work than men (Steiber, 2007)¹. Moreover, in the last twenty years the effects of increasing educational attainment interacted with rising labour market uncertainty due to the economic pressures of the fordist crisis and economic tertiarisation (Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003; Blossfeld et al., 2005; Steiber, 2007; for Italy, Barbieri and Scherer, 2009).

However, in the literature there is clear evidence that both the effects of increased female labour market participation and employment instability are filtered by welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Blossfeld et al., 2005). On the one hand, cross-country analyses confirmed how reconciliation of women’s work and family duties is eased in both socialdemocratic and liberal models, less in the conservative and, above all, in the Mediterranean one (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Sleebos, 2003; Del Boca and Wetzels, 2007). This produces the well-known finding of a positive cross-national correlation between female labour market participation and fertility rates (Ahn and Mira, 2002). On the other hand, the postponement of the transition to parenthood due to precarious labour market careers is stronger in the Conservative and Mediterranean models (Baizan, 2005; Bernardi and Nazio, 2005; Schmitt, 2005; Kreyenfeld, 2009; Barbieri (edited by), forthcoming).

According to this theoretical frame, Italy is part of the Mediterranean model. Here, both the lack of family policies, especially the very limited public provisions of childcare (Saraceno 1998, Hofaecker, 2003; De Henau et al., 2007), and the kind of labour market regulative system (Del Boca and Sauer, 2009) produced the global outcomes of low fertility as well as female labour market participation rates (Del Boca

¹ Opportunity-costs are given by the fact that when women delay first births, they increase their chances of securing well-paid employment as a result of their education, their accumulated on-the-job skills, and their experience (McDonald 2000). The same holds when they limit the duration of labour market withdrawals for childrearing (Heckman and Walker, 1990).

and Wetzels, 2007). Also the “partial and targeted deregulation” (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000), i.e. the specific way adopted by Southern European countries to cope with the need for labour market flexibility due to the globalization process (Blossfeld et al, 2005), contributed to the postponement of the transition to parenthood (Bernardi and Nazio, 2005; Barbieri (edited by), forthcoming).

Moreover, it is well-known that in Italy the steps of the transition to adulthood (exit from the school system, with a long stay in the family of origin during the search for the first stable job, leaving home *for* family formation, and eventually parenthood) are strictly connected with economic resources and employment stability among men, while for women it is more important to find a partner (Aassve et al., 2001a; Aassve et al., 2001b; Pisati, 2002; Bernardi and Nazio, 2005; Baizan and Martin-Garcia, 2006)². As a result, the sequence of events determining the transition to adulthood is quite more rigid here than in the other countries. These factors could worsen the postponement consequences of flexibilization reforms: as these brought to high labour market segmentation between typical and atypical contracts, with high employment and economic uncertainty for the latter (Barbieri and Scherer, 2007; 2009), the recent increase of atypical works may have delayed the whole process of transition to adulthood in Italy, much more than in other institutional settings.

If we pass on to the problem of women’s opportunity-costs and the effects of parental events on female labour market participation, one may argue that a “*flexicurity*” model, allowing more labour market fluidity (Luijkx and Muffels, 2008; Madsen, 2006), can ease women’s exits and re-entering in the labour market around childbirth (Bernardi, 1999; Del Boca and Sauer, 2009). The same holds for part-time employment availability (Del Boca and Wetzels, 2007). But Italy has a strong insider-outsider labour market arrangement (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000) as well as limited (and low-quality) part-time employment (Reyneri, 2008).

This labour market arrangement, along with the effects of the limited availability of childcare, help to explain the so-called “exit or full-time model” (Steiber, 2003; Lucchini et al., 2007; Del Boca and Sauer, 2009; Esping-Andersen, 2009), namely the

² It can be added that in most countries the effects of economic resources on parenthood are positive among men and negative among women (Noguera et al., 2005; Schmitt, 2005), with the exception of the socialdemocratic model (Bygren et al., 2005). But this especially holds for Italy and other “male-breadwinner” Southern European countries.

fact that most Italian women either work before and after entering motherhood or are non-employed at both times. In fact, when women step out of the labour market, they face strong obstacles for their re-entering (Gutierrez-Domenech, 2005). These conditions are reinforced by the fact that Italian women are rarely helped by their partner in the *ménage*: the time spent working (at home and on the market) is dramatically higher for an Italian married and working woman than for an Italian married housewife (Bimbi and La Mendola, 1999).

Thus, since Italian women have to decide between market and family orientation, the negative effect of education on the transition to the first child among women might be particularly strong³. This is confirmed by several scholars (for Spain see Baizan and Martin-Garcia, 2006; Martin-Garcia, 2009a; 2009b) who claimed that there are clear signals that decisions about education (especially the choice between “strong” and “weak” fields of study) and fertility are endogenous.

Besides these arguments concerning different institutional settings and increasing economic uncertainty, there is another stream in the literature that underlines the role of changing preferences toward the family domain to achieve full life-satisfaction. This argument is the core of the so-called “second demographic transition” thesis (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 1986; Van de Kaa, 1987; Lesthaeghe, 1995), that considers the shift toward “post-materialist” values (Inglehart, 1977) one of the main causes of the decrease in fertility rates. Some authors even claimed that “the reproduction of the species is not easily compatible with advanced industrial society” (Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003: 257), as now couples and individuals desire to develop a more individualized lifestyle, in which having children becomes one of many possible choices (Van de Kaa, 2004).

In short, the basic idea in the literature is that new Western fertility and marital patterns cannot be interpreted without starting from changes in mentality. In fact, as data for Western countries show, the orientation toward post-materialism increases

³ Moreover, the effects of education tend to become positive as far as higher-order childbirth and Scandinavian countries are concerned (Esping-Andersen et al., 2007). One hypothesis to explain such an effect is that highly-educated women are able to “convince” their (highly-educated) husbands to participate in childcare and homemaking (Brodmann et al., 2007). But this is possible only where a more egalitarian division of domestic work is already fostered by the institutional setting and employment equity (Breen and Cooke, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 2009).

cohort by cohort and this new pattern of values encourages cohabitation, low fertility and couple dissolution (Dalla Zuanna, 2001).

2. Differences in family formation in Northern and Southern Italy: internal migration as an interpretative key

Apart from gender, cohort, education and occupational differences, in Italy there is strong empirical evidence that reproductive behaviours are systematically different in Southern and Northern Italy (Santini, 1995; Pisati, 2002; Gabrielli et al., 2007; Rondinelli et al., 2010). In the main literature it is well-known that the South of Italy has historically been the Italian demographic reservoir (see graph 1), while in the last decades the North has registered the lowest fertility rates of the industrialized world (Della Zuanna and Impicciatore, 2008)⁴.

[about here graph 1]

While there is general agreement in the literature concerning territorial differences in terms of fertility rates, it is much more difficult to disentangle what their causes are. Since Southern and Northern Italy differ both in the institutional and economic setting and cultural orientations regarding the relevance of family (Della Zuanna, 2001), also in this case it seems reasonable to suppose that such differences are caused by both “structural” and “cultural” factors.

Regarding the former, the main factors that could explain the different timing of the transition to first and higher-order childbirths are surely related to the historical economic dualism between Northern and Southern Italian regions. More precisely, since in Italy a trade-off between employment and children for women still persists, it is

⁴ Actually, since the end of the ‘90s Italy started to experience a slow but constant increase in fertility rates. Billari and Galasso (2008) claimed that the introduction of pension reforms that decrease the income prospects after retirement, like the ones that have been introduced in Italy during the ‘90s, might have contributed to a rise in fertility. Besides, in the last ten years immigration raised dramatically and this also contributed to higher fertility rates (Della Zuanna, 2006). In addition, recent studies show that, for the first time in Italian history, the Northern fertility rate is higher than the Southern one (Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna, 2008). This switch may be in part due to a comparatively larger share of young immigrant births in the North, while other scholars stressed the role of the different distribution of public childcare in Northern and Southern Italy (Del Boca and Rosina, 2009).

possible that the lower female labour market participation in the South (Reyneri, 2005) could explain the higher fertility rates. Moreover, once women enter the labour market, it seems reasonable that the opportunity-costs connected with labour market withdrawals are much higher for Northern women: given a strong insider-outsider labour market setting, starting late or interrupting a career can be very costly in terms of earnings in the North, but much less in Southern Italy because of the high level of labour market uncertainty (Rondinelli et al., 2010). Additional explanatory factors are the stronger prevalence of public employment – that is far more “family-friendly” for women (Bernardi and Nazio, 2005) – and the higher availability of informal childcare in the South⁵.

Besides these explanations, it is also possible to think that Southerners and Northerners tend to give different importance to becoming parents. If this is the case, it is not surprising the young Northerners postpone family formation process in order to enjoy better their leisure time and to invest in labour market careers. This argument is confirmed by some empirical evidence. Moors (cited by Dalla Zuanna, 2001), for instance, in his comparative research showed that 57% of Italian aged 20-44 say that one cannot be really happy without children, comparing with the 7% of the Dutch. But strong differences can be traced comparing Northern and Southern Italy, even in more recent years. Also IARD data (2004) show that the share of young Northerners aged 15-34 claiming that in the future they will have only one child is twice as big as among Southerners (16% vs. 8%).⁶ And, to stress the differences in the orientation toward the male-breadwinner norm, only 30% of young men in Northern Italy strongly agreed that men should support women in domestic work, while the percentage dropped to 16% in the South.

Through our work we want to give a contribution to the discussed literature using South-to-North migrations as a key for a better understanding of the role of “structural” and “cultural” factors in the transition to parenthood. In order to do this, we compare family formation and fertility decisions of people living in the North, in the South and different types of South-to-North migrants. We claim that the last one is a critical group

⁵ Rayneri (2008) on this point stressed that what really makes the difference among women who continue to work and the ones who stop working after childbirth is the possibility to rely regularly on grandparents, rather than on the limited public childcare system and husbands’ help.

⁶ The IARD is a national institute for the analysis of the conditions of Italian youth.

because Southern internal migrants are socialized to the Southerner model of familiar behaviour, although they share the same economic and institutional setting with Northerners.

More precisely, by means of a model of transition to parenthood for Italian men based on the literature presented in the first paragraph, we want to test if: a) North and South of Italy significantly differ in term of fertility decisions and b) whether or not South-to-North migrants' family behaviours reflect the possible fertility preferences dominant in their childhood environment. In order to point out some precise research hypotheses on the relation between migration and fertility decisions, the literature concerning geographical mobility and its effects on individuals' life-cycle has to be taken into account.

3. Internal migration and fertility decisions

Unlike those Italians who emigrated abroad after the Second World War and eventually returned to their place of origin, the great majority of Southerners who moved to the North did so definitely. Many Southern internal migrants married, had children, and gave life to a second generation of immigrants in the Northern regions (Ginsborg, 1989). In spite of this, recent social-demographic research has paid little attention to the future of Southern migrants in Northern Italy, even if we know that, also for the internal migration, moving from one place to another is an important life event, accompanied by both short and long-term changes in an individual's life (Impicciatore and Dalla Zuanna 2006).

In order to tackle these lacks, in this paragraph we point out some research hypotheses using the existing literature on the effects of geographical movement on fertility decisions. This typically identified four mechanisms linking migration and fertility: socialization, selection, adaptation and disruption (Goldstein and Goldstein, 1983)⁷. The *socialization* hypothesis refers to the tendency of migrants to reflect the

⁷ It is important to point out that this framework is generally used in order to analyze the rural-urban migration, but it seems useful also to analyze the Italian internal migration phenomena. In fact, it is well-known that Italian internal migrations involved mainly Southerners from the rural area (Barberis, 1961; Treves, 1976) and that the major industrial areas in North-Western Italy (concentrated in the "industrial

fertility preferences dominant in their childhood environment: migrants exhibit similar fertility levels to “stayers” at origin, and the convergence towards fertility levels of population at destination occurs only in the following generations (Caldwell, 1982). This hypothesis emphasises the critical role of childhood environment, where norms and values dominant in a migrant’s childhood environment guide his/her later actions in other places as well (Goldberg 1959; 1960; Hervitz, 1985; Mayer and Riphahn, 2000; Andersson, 2001).

The second mechanism through which migration affects fertility is the *adaptation* to the fertility regime of the destination. This could be associated with the assimilation theory (see, for instance, Gordon, 1964; Massey at al., 1993) and it argues that fertility is determined both by the social and cultural norms of the current residential environment (Caldwell, 1982), and by the different household income, wages and constraints in prices and incomes (Becker, 1981). In short, exposure to different socio-cultural norms and costs of childbearing changes fertility behaviour, to the point that migrants’ fertility tends to converge with that of the natives at destination. . As a further complexity, migrants may do more than adapt, in the sense that their fertility behaviour might reflect a particularly keen desire to advance economically (Dalla Zuanna 2006; Bernardi 2007), a scenario described as the *social mobility hypothesis* in the internal migration-fertility literature (Singley and Nancy, 1998). Obviously, as the process of assimilation is gradual and as it typically takes a long time to influence fertility, adaptation may not affect the fertility of circular and seasonal migrants⁸.

Yet this debate is complicated by a potential bias. The *selection* hypothesis, in fact, claims that migrants are a specific group of people whose fertility preferences are more similar to those of people at destination rather than at origin. Such hypothesis has been discussed in many papers, but it was empirically examined only by a few studies (Myers and Morris, 1966; Goldstein, 1973; Zarate and Zarate, 1975). For the Italian internal migration, this mechanism can be related to the *anticipated socialization* described by Alberoni and Baglioni (1965). The authors, in fact, claimed that internal migrants were

triangle” of Milan, Turin and Genoa), together with Rome, were powerful points of attraction (Ginsborg 1989; Bonifazi and Heinz, 1999).

⁸ A strict and mechanical application of the adaptation notion would suggest that movers from high income (corresponding low fertility) areas to lower income (corresponding to high fertility) areas exhibit increases in childbearing. Unfortunately in our dataset we do not have enough cases of North-to-South migrants for test this hypothesis.

characterized by different personal traits or behavioural intentions rather than those who remained in the South: they were those who acquired values and behaviour of the destination country before they left their own country. This happened because internal migrants were already aware of the fact that to live in the new society and obtain success it was necessary to adopt specific ways of life⁹.

Finally, it is also possible that migrants show particularly low levels of fertility due to the disruptive factors associated with the migration process. The effect of *disruption*, which has been studied most often in relation to temporary migration, tends to lower the fertility of migrants compared with non-migrants (Carlson, 1985; Ford, 1990; Kahn, 1994; Ram and George, 1990). This inference may derive from seasonal factors (Massey and Mullan, 1984), spousal separation (Goldstain et al., 1973; Visaria, 1969), or from the typical costs associated with migrations (Hervitz, 1985). It also seems plausible that disruption could reflect some initial adaptation strategy, where normal plans for childbearing are temporarily set aside while economic (but not cultural) adjustments to the new society are made. The effects of disruption, however, are posited to be temporary, occurring only during a short period of time after geographical movements, then fertility may resume its previous level, or even accelerate in order to compensate for the disruption (Sharma, 1992)¹⁰.

Of course these four mechanisms could be not mutually exclusive. For conceptual clarity, the patterns are described in their “pure” forms, but the processes they represent are more likely to be complementary than competing (Singley and Nancy, 1998). For instance, it is possible that there is socialization, but in the short period the disruption effect could make migrants unable to reproduce the fertility pattern of the South. Adaptation is also possible in the long run (namely for second generations of migrants), while in the short run migrants manifest the fertility behaviours of the region of origin. It seems more reasonable to think of these four mechanisms as operating at different stages of the migration process. Adaptation may take a long time (at least two generations), the effect of disruption may only last for a short time (Gorwaney et al. 1998), and the effect of socialization can be constant across time.

⁹ The term “anticipated socialization” was used by Merton (1951) to describe the acquisition of a behaviour pattern relevant to a specific context before the reasons for its adoption have been created.

¹⁰ At this point one could argue that, in the case of internal migration, the effect of disruption could be mitigated. However, several studies claim that disruption also operates in the case of the Italian internal migration (see, for instance, Alasia and Montaldi 1960; Fofi 1964; Ginsborg 1989).

While contradictory conclusions of studies often arise because different historical period, social context and types of migration are taken into account, the dependence on cross-sectional data of studies concerning migrants fertility has significantly limited the possibilities to clarify which views is true in the respective context and for the behaviour of the particular migrants group (Kulu and Milewski, 2007). On the contrary, in the case of Italian internal migration we are able to make some clear distinctions that allow us to show the role of preferences on fertility decisions and the validity of an integrated theory of the relations between migrations and transition to childbirths. Firstly, we are able to control the socialization and the selection hypotheses comparing the fertility decisions of Northerners, Southerners and internal migrants. Secondly, in order to better analyze the assimilation hypothesis in the long run, we take into account also migrants' children. Finally, to control the disruption effect, we analyze both the transition to the first child (where, following the theory, the costs of geographical mobility are higher) and the transition to the second child (where such costs are reduced). In the next paragraph we try to systematise and apply this theoretical framework to the Italian case and we point out our research hypotheses.

3.1 A model for fertility decisions: assumptions and hypotheses

On the basis of the discussed literature, the transition to parenthood of Italian men can be summarized as follows:

$$U = f(\underset{+}{R}, \underset{-}{E}, \underset{-}{Woc}, \underset{\pm}{P}, \underset{-}{Mc}) \quad (1)$$

where U is the utility, R denotes the economic resources and earning potentials, E represents the time spent in the educational system, Woc are women's opportunity-costs, P are the preferences toward parenthood and Mc are the migration costs. Since employment rates of Southern women are extremely lower, we assume that the negative impact of Woc in the North is higher than in the South ($Woc_n > Woc_s$)¹¹. We can also

¹¹ We have seen how this is not only due to the level of female labour market participation itself, but also to the lowest opportunity-costs of labour market withdrawals for Southerner women, given the higher level of labour market uncertainty.

assume that Northerners' preferences are lower than those of the Southerners ($P_n < P_s$) and both are stable across time within one's life. Regarding migrants, if they are a self-selected group, then their preferences are equal to those of the Northerners ($P_m = P_n$); on the contrary, if the socialization hypothesis is verified, their preferences are equal to those of the Southerners ($P_m = P_s$). Finally, since we have seen that geographical mobility could cause disruption effects, we have included in the equation the term related to migration costs (M_c). Obviously such term is equal to zero for Southerners and Northerners ($M_c = 0$), while it could be higher than zero for migrants ($M_c \geq 0$). We assume that the impact of disruption may last for a short time only, i.e. M_c only affects the timing of the first child.

If the differences between Northerners and Southerners are only the manifestation of compositional factors (age, education, individuals' and their wives' employment, etc.) or different institutional and economic contexts, then suitable controls would remove all regional effects. In this case we are able to control only the disruption mechanism (M_c), because the term P is equal between Northerners and Southerners. But, if some differences still persist, then we are able to test also the socialization and the selection hypotheses. In table 2 we present several hypotheses concerning the speed at each transition for Northerners, Southerners and South-to-North migrants, according to the discussed theories.

[about here table 1]

This table suggests that:

- a) if migrants are faster than Northerners in any of the transitions, then the selection hypothesis is rejected;
- b) if we do observe that migrants are faster than Northerners, then the socialization hypothesis is confirmed. But, as there could still be significant disruption effects at the transition to the first child, we could observe migrants to be faster than Northerners only at the second childbirth;
- c) finally, if the adaptation hypothesis is proved, we should observe that the second generation of migrants is similar to Northerners in both transitions.

3. Data, variables and methods

The data used here are taken from the Italian Household Longitudinal Survey (ILFI). This is a prospective panel study, with a first retrospective wave, based on biennial surveys begun in 1997 and concluded in 2005 on a national sample of around 10,000 individuals aged 18 and over. By merging all the five available waves, we obtained a person-month dataset with geographical, educational, employment and family histories of 3,500 men born in the period 1932-1975, as well as some time-constant social background characteristics¹².

We decided to focus on men only for three reasons. First of all, men's transition to parenthood has been studied much less in socio-demographic literature. Secondly, in the Italian setting men's contribution to the household's income is still much more important than women's one, therefore the theoretical arguments concerning the importance of economic resources mainly apply to men (Bernardi and Nazio, 2005)¹³. Finally, the typical Italian internal migration usually implies that men migrate first to search for a job, while their partners later rejoin them (Reyneri 1979; Ramella 2001; 2003).

The independent variable is a time-varying one and it regards a typology of geographical mobility. In ILFI data, individuals experience an episode of geographical mobility when they change their province of residence. We consider three kinds of South-to-North migrants, whose behaviours can be compared with individuals never moving from Northern Italy. This variable contains the following statuses:

- a) *Southerners*: Southerners that have never moved from the South;
- b) *migrants*: Southerners after moving towards Northern regions;
- c) *returned*: migrants after coming back to the South;

¹² About 300 cases have been lost for missing information on social class and class of origin. We were not able to find any statistical difference among these cases and the ones included in the analyses in terms of fundamental socio-demographic characteristics.

¹³ For an in-depth comparison between Italian men and women's transition to parenthood see Bernardi (2001), Pisati (2002) and Bernardi and Nazio (2005).

d) *commuters*: Southerners with more than two residential episodes between Southern and Northern Italy¹⁴.

[about here table 2]

In order to test the assimilation hypothesis in the long run, we have also included the second generation of immigrants in the analysis, although the limited number of cases did not allow us to make accurate distinctions inside this group. More precisely, we could not include the second generation of migrants born in Northern regions in the analysis, because they are too young to study their familiar transitions. Anyway, within the group of Northerners we were able to distinguish a category for the so-called “generation 1.5” (Rumbaut, 1997; 2004), i.e. children of Southerners who moved to the North following their parents before they were 15 years old and then never coming back to the South¹⁵.

All models control five birth cohorts: 1932-1940, 1941-1949, 1950-1958, 1959-1967, 1968-1975. Models also include annual average unemployment rates at the national level as a measure of economic conjuncture¹⁶. Employment histories are included in all models by means of three time-varying variables. The first one entails the employment condition, distinguishing whether individuals are employed, unemployed or inactive. Both the social class of origin and the individual social class are coded following a variation on the Erickson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero (EGP) classification, adapting it to Italian society (Barbagli, Capecchi and Cobalti, 1988; Cobalti and Schizzerotto, 1994; Ballarino and Cobalti, 2003). The scheme that is used here includes *bourgeoisie* (which contains three sub-classes, big entrepreneurs,

¹⁴ We could not verify if these migrants eventually remained in Northern or Southern Italy as they are very few. They have been included in the typology only to control the effects of more “challenging” migration projects and their results are not shown.

¹⁵ Of course the issue of the second generation of immigrants is much more complex, as the process of assimilation in the receiving society depends on the timing of migration within the life-cycle. In fact, the speed and the degree of integration could be rather different among those who were born in the receiving society, who arrived in their infancy or during childhood or adulthood. For instance, making the migration during infancy or early childhood could bring to a double socialization and cultural asymmetries. Moreover, the interruption of the educational process and the integration in the new school system could represent sources of disadvantages eventually producing inequalities and marginalization.

¹⁶ Data are taken from the site <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx>. It would have been more precise for our aims to include in the models annual average unemployment rates distinguished between Northern and Southern regions, but unfortunately we did not have this information for such a long time-span.

managers and professionals) as the highest class. The two middle classes are the *white collars* and the (urban and agricultural) *petty bourgeoisie*: the first includes non-manual employees and corresponds to classes IIIa and IIIb of the EGP scheme; the second incorporates small employers (up to fifteen employees) and self-employed workers and corresponds to classes IVa, IVb and IVc of the EGP scheme. Finally, our scheme includes a *working class* category, again distinguishing urban and agricultural workers. This encompasses both manual skilled and unskilled urban working class as well as the agricultural working class.

Information concerning the educational history is threefold, entailing educational enrolment, level and field of study. First of all, all models include a time-varying dummy indicating whether individuals are enrolled in the educational system or not. Then we included a time-varying variable concerning the level of education attained (elementary, lower-secondary, higher-secondary and tertiary). The higher-secondary level has been operationalized in three categories: “gender neutral” (*licei*), “female-oriented” (teacher training and education science, fine and applied art, foreign languages and vocational programmes in the commercial field), “male-oriented” (vocational programmes in the industrial and craft sectors)¹⁷. The tertiary level has been divided into “female-oriented” and “male-oriented” too: the former includes teacher training and education sciences, humanities, social and behavioural sciences, law and medicine; the latter entails all other fields (natural sciences, economics and statistics, engineering and architecture).

The type of contract has been included to distinguish individuals’ employment relation and it is subdivided into five categories: permanent contract, “traditional” self-employment, “atypical” employment (fixed-term contracts and pseudo-self employment), seasonal and off-the-books jobs.

The model analysing the transition to the first child includes a time-varying dummy variable indicating whether individuals are married or not. When the dependant process is the second childbirth, three additional variables have been added: the parental age at the first child, wives’ educational level (elementary, lower-secondary, higher-secondary and tertiary) and a time-varying dummy on the employment condition (employed/not employed).

¹⁷ Concerning the operationalization of the field of study, following Martin-Garcia (2009a; 2009b), all “female-oriented” fields of study are related to the care of individuals or involve relational skills.

We model two durations: the month of the first child and of the second child (only for those who experienced the first childbirth). The observational window begins at the age of 15 and ends with the birth of the first or the second child. When studying the transition to the second child, observation begins at the month of the first birth and ends with the second childbirth. In all models, observation ends at the age of 45 for right-censored cases.

These two dependent processes are studied by means of cox models¹⁸. These are proportional hazard semi-parametric duration models that have the advantage of estimating the coefficients for independent variables without making assumptions about the distribution of survival times. We thought that it could represent a good choice for reasons of homogeneity among models, as we analyse processes characterized by potentially different types of time-dependency¹⁹.

4. Empirical evidence

In graph 2 we present some descriptive results concerning the median ages at the transitions to the first union and child and North-South differences²⁰. The general Italian men's postponement of the transition to familiar events appear clearly in the upper half of the graph, but it is stronger among Northerners. Moreover, in lower part of the graph we see how, after a little decrease between the first and the second cohorts, the time-span between the first union and the first child increases across cohorts. But, again, this holds especially for Northerners.

[about here graph 2]

Even if these are only descriptive results, it is already possible to interpret these findings in the light of the theoretical antithesis between the “institutional-labour market” argument and the “second demographic transition” theses. On the one hand, the

¹⁸ Exact-marginal calculation has been used to cope with tied data.

¹⁹ Results showed to be constant regardless of the method used.

²⁰ Since we want to give a clear picture of the observed differences between the two areas, we excluded South-to-North migrants from the analysis.

observed U-shaped historical pattern of familiar transitions seems to cast doubts on the prevalence of ideational shifts: the cohorts born in the first decades of the XX century had to face the economic downturns of the '30s as well as of the two World Wars; the post-war cohorts enjoyed the economic boom between the '50s and '60s; since the late '70s, and especially during the '90s, the situation has been worsened by the effects of labour market deregulations (see for instance Mills et al., 2005).

On the other hand, the dramatic and rapid increase in North-South differences concerning the distance between first union and first child also put on the table the issue of different preferences toward parenthood. The general results showed in graph 1 suggest that in the South family is still the place devoted to the reproduction, while in the North partnerships are becoming increasingly independent from reproductive behaviours, accordingly to the arguments of the second demographic transition (see for instance Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003). But it should also be noticed that this pattern closely follows the different levels and paces of increase of female labour market participation in the two areas (Reyneri, 2005; 2008).

We now need to undergo these different interpretations to more strict empirical test including South-to-North migrations in the analysis. In table 3 we present cox models to study Italian's men transitions toward first child.

[about here table 3]

Starting from model 1, we comment on some interesting effects of the control variables. First of all, the non-linear effect of birth-cohort on the transition to the first child represents the U-shaped pattern already discussed. Regarding education, once we control the strong negative effect of educational enrolment, the level of education has non-linear effects among men on the transition to the first child: individuals with tertiary education in "strong/male oriented" field of study are only slightly slower than those with only primary education. The slowest group is that with secondary education in "gender neutral" fields of study (*licei*), given the total absence of a vocational orientation. These results largely overlap those of Martin-Garcia (2009b) for Spanish men and underline the crucial role of economic resources and earning potentials on fertility decisions. Therefore, it is not surprising that having a job is fundamental for

Italian men in order to make familiar transitions, even if it makes only little difference if their job is highly rewarding and with a permanent contract (Pisati, 2002; Bernardi and Nazio, 2005)²¹.

As for the effects of territorial origin and migration history, what we observe is that all categories of Southerners (migrants or not) are faster than Northerners in making the transition to the first child. This partially holds even for the 1.5 generation of migrants, apparently indicating that maybe the process of adaptation to Northerners' condition is still not concluded. Anyway, we are not controlling here for the timing at the first union and for the wives' employment condition.

Once we check for the month of the first union, therefore we model the distance between first union and first child, then we get a rather different picture (Model 2). First of all, almost all the effects of individuals' education and employment disappear. This is a clear sign of how childbirth is strongly linked to marriage in the Italian context, as it has been already found in the literature on Italy (Pisati, 2002; Bernardi and Nazio, 2005). This could already bring to consider the remaining significant effects as connected with some other factors, rather than "structural" ones. Moreover, migrants and their children seem to be as fast as Northerners, while Southerners and returned migrants are still much faster than all other groups. This could be interpreted as the role of different socialization models among Southerners/returned, while we do not know whether migrants who remain in the North are similar to Northerners because of a selection mechanism, fast adaptation to new structural conditions or high disruption effects (see table 2). We can get some additional hints on this point in the analysis of the transition to the second child.

By far we are still missing an important component of our theoretical model: the role played by the fact of having an employed wife. Of course, in order to check for employed women's opportunity-costs, we need to focus on those individuals who eventually got married, consequently in Model 3 we have estimated the distance between the first union and the first child only for those individuals who are observed getting married in the observational window, checking for the age at first union. Of course the

²¹ The positive effects of being in high class and holding a permanent contract are much stronger as far as we focus on the transition to the first union. Moreover, for the youngest generation affected by the labour market deregulation the negative effects of fixed-term contracts on familiar transitions are much stronger. Results are available by the authors on demand.

pattern of results does not change if we do not insert the variable concerning wives' employment condition. But in Model 4 we see that if individuals' wife is employed, the distance between first union and first child dramatically increases²². Moreover, as predicted in our theoretical model, given the lower opportunity-costs, those negative effects are much weaker among Southerners and migrants who came back to the South. In addition, if we look at the differences between Southerners and Northerners when their wife is not employed, we may notice that the higher speed among Southerners men almost disappears, remaining barely significant at the 10% level.

The last finding shows that the overall role of preferences in the timing of the transition to the first child is rather negligible. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that the strongly increasing difference between Northern and Southern Italy in the distance between the first union and the first child (see graph 2) is almost due to the trends in female labour market participation in the two areas.

We now need to move to the transition to the second child in order to see if it is possible to find more evidence for the role of preferences. The results of this analysis are shown in table 4.

[about here table 4]

Again, we start from commenting some interesting results for the control variables. First of all, in Model 1, where we do not check for wives' employment condition, we find a strong negative effect of the age at first child on the transition to the second child, as it has been found in similar studies (see for instance Rondinelli et al., 2010). More interestingly here, we find two factors reducing the time to the second child: being son of agricultural workers (especially in Model 2) and having tertiary education in female-oriented fields of study. While the first can be easily related to the high fertility rates of traditional rural environments, the second is less straightforward. On the one hand, this confirms those findings showing that educational attainment completely reverse its sign

²² In this model we lose 12,6% of the sample comparing with Model 3 . That is because not for all individuals partners' information is available. Moreover, individuals in ILFI were only asked about their partners at the moment of the interview, not necessarily the one of the first union for individuals who divorced and remarried. Anyway, comparing the pattern of results in Model 3 and Model IV we see how they largely overlap, suggesting that no biases are present in our analyses. The same holds for models in table 4.

when we shift from the timing of the first childbirth to the transition to higher-order childbirths, even if the latter mainly referred to Scandinavian countries (see note 3). So, it is possible that, even in Italy, highly educated husbands, but only those who studied in the fields concerned with the care of individuals, could be more sensitive toward gender equality in the distribution of domestic work, and this could foster higher-order childbirths. On the other hand, it is possible that educational and fertility choices are driven by unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. that individuals reaching the highest level of education (in female-oriented fields) could attach higher value to children (see for instance Dalla Zuanna and Impicciatore, 2008)²³.

Anyway, it seems reasonable that both the effects of the agricultural field and educational level give signals of a more important role of preferences as far as higher-order childbirths are concerned.

And, actually, in Model 1 we find that North-South differences are now much stronger and observed even among migrants. Anyway, we still find that migrants are significantly slower than Southerners. But, once we include in the model the dummy variable indicating whether individuals' wives are employed or not, interacted with our typology (Model 2), on the one hand strong differences between Northerners and Southerners with a not employed wife still persist; on the other hand, migrants are no more significantly slower than Southerners. It is interesting to notice how women's opportunity-costs are even larger among migrants comparing with Northerners, and especially with Southerners. That could be not only because migrants' wives are employed in a more rewarding labour market, but also because they can not rely anymore on the informal childcare provided by the enlarged family. And we have seen how informal childcare constitutes almost the only available means for women's reconciliation between work and family duties in Italy (Reyneri, 2008).

We argue that these results are relevant for both the theoretical debate concerning the role of preferences in fertility decisions and the theories linking migrations and fertility. First of all, preferences do matter, but their role only appears if higher-order childbirths are concerned. This finding is in line with what has been argued by

²³ An alternative explanation could be that those individuals weaker in the labour market try to compensate their weakness in the family domain. This could explain the positive effects of working off-the-books or with seasonal contracts, that have been found elsewhere for Italy (see Bernardi and Nazio, 2005).

Rondinelli et al. (2010), who claimed that the evidence of a clear North/South division appears in the decision to have more than one child. But these authors generally referred to “institutional or cultural” factors, while with our analysis we are much more confident to report on different socialization models, as we compared Northerners and migrants’ behaviours, who share the same institutional setting. For this reason, coming back to our research hypotheses (table 2), we can reject the selection and fast adaptation hypotheses, as migrants showed to be faster than Northerners. And, actually, also theoretical arguments suggest that a selection mechanism could be globally negligible.

In the literature it is well-known that there could be a positive self-selection of migrants, but we also know that the spread of migrants’ social network in the region of destination decrease the migration costs and, hence, raise the probability of migrate. In other words, as network expand the migration flow become less selective in socioeconomics terms and more representative of the sending society (Boyd, 1989; Massey et al., 1993; Massey, 1990; Fussell and Massey, 2004; Massey et al., 2005). Thus, since in the literature it is well-known that the social networks of southern migrants in the North are fairly well developed (Reyneri 1979; Ramella 2001; Signorelli 1995), it is reasonable to think that this dynamic also works for the Italian internal migration. This assumption is strengthened by the facts that the Italian internal migration is a relatively old migration flow – the first consistent wave of migration started between the two World Wars (Treves 1976) – and that in some birth cohorts almost 30% of Southerners is observed migrate to the North.

We can also argue that our results are not in contradiction with the presence of disruptional effects in the short-run, as migrants were slower than Southerners at the transition to the first child. But considering the transition to the second child, where migration costs are reduced, migrants reproduce the fertility preferences dominant in their childhood environment. Finally, the generation 1.5 of migrants is faster than Northerners only in the transition to the first stable union, therefore we can argue that the adaptation process is already observable.

Conclusion

In Italy, given the features of the institutional setting, the general trend toward a postponement of familiar transitions and a decrease in fertility rates has been stronger than in other European countries. But, in this respect, there are also huge historical differences between Northern and Southern Italy, although reducing in the last ten years. We saw how these differences can be largely explained by different women's opportunity-costs as far as the transition to the first child is concerned.

Nevertheless, when we shift to the transition to the second child, differences between Northern and Southern Italy persist, even checking for wives' employment condition. We argue that these differences can be connected to individuals' preferences toward children, rather than institutional or economic factors. That is because migrants behave similarly to Southerners, even if they share the same institutional environment of Northerners.

Our analyses give two contributions to field literature. Firstly, even recognizing the importance of welfare regimes in shaping the micro-mechanisms linked to female labour market participation, our findings suggest that the role of preferences should not be forgotten. We argue that these are related to the socialization in different childhood environments, giving more or less importance to children to achieve full life-satisfaction. Secondly, our analyses contribute to the literature concerned with the effects of migrations on individuals' life-cycles. In fact, our results give some hints in favour of an integrated theory of the relations between migrations and reproductive behaviours. This theory includes, in the appropriate moments of migrants' lives, all the main alternative theories suggested in the literature: disruption works in the short-run, i.e. at the transition to the first child; adaptation happens across generations while socialization, whose effects are constant within one's life, strongly influence higher-order childbirth. Of course the limited number of cases could cast some doubts on the strength of our results. But we argue that our analyses have been able to grasp a meaningful pattern of results despite the limited number of migrants included.

These results suggest that in Italy the *timing* of the transition to adulthood is strongly related to economic and institutional conditions, while preferences can affect the *number* of children people might think to have. But, since the age at each step of familiar transitions has negative effects on the next steps, when the postponement reaches the levels observed in the last decades, then of course this negatively influences

the likelihood of experiencing additional childbirth, independently from individuals' preferences. Therefore, all institutional factors fostering the postponement of the transition to adulthood (atypical employment, lack of family policies and so on) create mismatches between individuals' desires and actual behaviour.

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Tables

Table 1: Speed at childbirths for Southerners, Northerners and migrants according to different migration theories.


		Socialization ($P_m=Ps$)	Selection or adaptation in the short run ($P_m=P_n$)	Adaptation in the long run (second generation of migrants) ($P_m \rightarrow P_n$)
Witho ut disruption	<i>First child</i> ($C_m=0$)	Migrants as fast as Southerners, both faster than Northerners	No differences between migrants and Northerners, both slower than Southerners	No differences between migrants and Northerners, both slower than Southerners
	<i>Second child</i> ($C_m=0$)	Migrants as fast as Southerners, both faster than Northerners	No differences between migrants and Northerners, both slower than Southerners	No differences between migrants and Northerners, both slower than Southerners
With Disrup tion	<i>First child</i> ($C_m>0$)	Migrants slower than Southerners	Migrants slower than Northerners and Southerners	
	<i>Second child</i> ($C_m \approx 0$)	Migrants as fast as Southerners, both faster than Northerners	No differences between migrants and Northerners, both slower than Southerners	

Table 2: Territorial origin and migration history at 45 years old.

	%	(N)
Northerners	57,9	(2.027)
Generation 1.5	2,5	(87)
Southerners	30,7	(1.076)
Migrants	5,1	(178)
Returned	2,7	(94)
Commuters	1,0	(38)
Total	100,0	(3.500)


Source: Ilfi (1997; 1999; 2001; 2003; 2005)

Graph 1: Total fertility rate Italy, 1935-1970 birth cohorts



Source: Istat

Graph 2: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the median ages at the first union and at the first child (upper part of the graph); differences (in years) between first union and first child and differences (in years) between North and South in the transition to the first child and first union.



Source: Ilfi (1997; 1999;2001; 2003; 2005)

Table 3: duration of the transition to first child. Cox models. Hazard ratios and significance levels

	First child			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Cohort [ref. 1932-40]</i>				
1941-1949	1,26***	0,89	0,88*	0,86**
1950-1958	1,74***	0,96	0,82***	0,88**
1959-1967	1,42***	0,81*	0,60***	0,65***
1968-1975	0,66***	0,63***	0,48***	0,57***
<i>Territorial origin and migration history [ref. Northerners]</i>				
Generation 1.5	1,24	1,02	1,01	0,80
Southerners	1,47***	1,44***	1,50***	1,13*
Migrants	1,33***	1,03	1,09	0,95
Returned	1,78***	1,35**	1,31**	0,84
<i>Wife employed</i>				
Generation 1.5*wife employed				0,59***
Southerners *wife employed				1,26
Migrants*wife employed				1,49***
Returned*wife employed				1,07
<i>Unempl. Rate</i>	1,01	1,08		1,89**
<i>Unempl. Rate^2</i>	0,99	0,99		
<i>Class of origin [ref. bourgeoisie]</i>				
White collar	0,99	0,81	0,88	0,95
Urban petty bourgeoisie	1,02	0,87	0,95	0,97
Agricultural petty bourgeoisie	1,07	1,08	1,11	1,14
Urban working class	1,07	0,87	0,92	0,92
Agricultural working class	1,07	1,02	1,08	1,07
<i>Educational enrolment</i>	0,63***	0,90	0,75**	0,90
<i>Education [ref. Elementary]</i>				
Low-secondary	0,84***	0,97	0,94	0,96
Hi-sec (gender neutral)	0,41***	0,72**	0,69***	0,71**
Hi-sec (female oriented)	0,76**	1,09	1,06	1,08
Hi-sec (male oriented)	0,70***	1,00	0,98	1,01
Univ (female oriented)	0,60***	1,02	0,96	1,05
Univ (male oriented)	0,74**	0,93	0,90	1,00
<i>Employment condition [ref. employed]</i>				
Unemployed	0,48***	0,76	0,76	0,86
Out of labour market	0,44***	0,77	0,69**	0,66**
<i>Class [ref. agricultural petty bourgeoisie]</i>				
Bourgeoisie	1,18	1,06	0,85	0,73
White collar	1,21	1,13	0,99	0,98
Urban petty bourgeoisie	1,18	1,04	0,88	0,86
Urban working class	1,07	1,19	1,10	1,08
Agricultural working class	1,06	0,88	0,86	1,02
<i>Employment relations [ref. traditional self-employed]</i>				
Permanent contract	0,99	0,77	0,73*	0,74**
Atypical contract	0,91	0,89	0,76	0,75

Off-the-books	0,93	0,94	0,88	0,80
Seasonal	0,92	1,09	0,99	0,96
<i>Married</i>		170,44***		
<i>Age at first union</i>			0,97***	0,97***
N. subjects	3.182	3.182	2.442	2.134
N. failures	2.186	2.186	2.108	1.912
N. observations	618.079	618.079	88.853	71.531
Log-likelihood	-12285,4	-9739,09	-9055,63	-7927,21

(***: $p < 0.01$; **: $p < 0.05$; *: $p < 0.1$)

Source: Ilfi (1997; 1999; 2001; 2003; 2005)

Table 4: duration of the transition to the second child. Cox models. Hazard ratio and significance levels

	Second child	
	Model 1	Model 2
<i>Cohort [ref. 1932-40]</i>		
1941-1949	0,80***	0,83**
1950-1958	0,70***	0,69***
1959-1967	0,63***	0,64***
1968-1975	0,75**	0,86
<i>Territorial origin and migration history [ref. Northerners]</i>		
Generation 1.5	0,99	0,85
Southerners	2,13***	1,85***
Migrants	1,37***	1,53***
Returned	1,82***	1,36
<i>Wife employed</i>		
Generation 1.5*wife employed		0,70***
Southerners *wife employed		1,13
Migrants*wife employed		1,20
Returned*wife employed		0,74
		1,58
<i>Unempl. Rate</i>		
<i>Unempl. Rate^2</i>		
<i>Class of origin [ref. bourgeoisie]</i>		
White collar	0,84	0,91
Urban petty bourgeoisie	1,04	1,07
Agricultural petty bourgeoisie	1,13	1,25
Urban working class	0,92	0,98
Agricultural working class	1,25	1,36**
<i>Educational enrolment</i>	1,13	1,18
<i>Education [ref. Elementary]</i>		
Low-secondary	1,06	1,07
Hi-sec (gender neutral)	1,22	1,28
Hi-sec (female oriented)	1,08	1,08
Hi-sec (male oriented)	1,08	1,00
Univ (female oriented)	1,43**	1,37**
Univ (male oriented)	1,20	1,19
<i>Employment condition [ref. employed]</i>		
Unemployed	1,12	1,19
Out of labour market	1,12	1,28
<i>Class [ref. agricultural petty bourgeoisie]</i>		
Bourgeoisie	1,09	1,23
White collar	1,12	1,18
Urban petty bourgeoisie	1,25	1,23
Urban working class	0,96	0,99
Agricultural working class	0,74	0,70
<i>Employment relations [ref. traditional self-employed]</i>		
Permanent contract	0,97	0,96
Atypical contract	0,95	0,91

Off-the-books	1,16	1,28
Seasonal	1,39	1,35
<i>Married</i>	2,94***	
<i>Age at first child</i>	0,96***	0,96***
N. subjects	2.182	1.949
N. failures	1.513	1.408
N. observations	157.604	139.839
Log-likelihood	-7541,12	-6917,88

(***: $p < 0.01$; **: $p < 0.05$; *: $p < 0.1$)
Source: Ilfi (1997; 1999; 2001; 2003; 2005)